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Abstract 
 
In  this  paper,  we  examine  whether  a  minimum  level  of  ensured 
consumption from a social safety net has the potential of breaking the 
vicious circle of risk avoidance and low return in African agriculture. We 
study  how  the  implementation  of  a  social  safety  net  programme  in 
Ethiopia has affected the value, risk and composition of farmers’ crop 
portfolios. The effects of programme participation on the value and risk 
of the crop portfolio are examined in a Just-Pope production function, 
and the effects of programme participation on composition of the crop 
portfolio are tested in a set of acreage response models. The empirical 
analysis is based on unique household panel data that allow us to control 
for unobserved heterogeneity. No significant effect on the value and risk 
of the crop portfolio could be found. However, the programme seems to 
have brought about some changes in the land allocated to different crops. 
The greatest effect is towards increased cultivation of perennials, which 
are high-value, high-risk crops in this part of Ethiopia.   
 
 
Keywords: Crop choice, Social safety nets, Food-for-work programmes, 
PSNP, Ethiopia 
JEL classification: Q12, Q18, O22  
 Can a social safety net affect farmers’ crop portfolios?  1 
 
1  Introduction 
 
In  this  paper  we  examine  whether  a  minimum  level  of  ensured 
consumption from a social safety net has the potential of breaking the 
vicious circle of risk avoidance and low productivity in African agriculture. 
We  study  how  the  implementation  of  the  Productive  Safety  Net 
Programme, a social safety net programme in Ethiopia, has affected the 
value, risk and composition of farmers’ crop portfolios. 
 
In the development debate, it is often emphasised that the difficulties of 
managing risk are an important reason for the low productivity in African 
agriculture (see e.g. World Bank, 2007). The argument put forward is that, 
since unexpected shortfalls in income cannot be handled through credit or 
insurance  markets,  farmers  are  often  forced  to  opt  for  strategies  that 
reduce the risk of starvation but may trap them in poverty.  
 
A number of previous studies have found that farmers who have access to 
consumption credit, liquid assets or off-farm income that can be used to 
maintain a certain level of consumption during negative income shocks 
are more likely to choose an income portfolio with higher average risk and 
higher average return, while farmers without these opportunities are more 
likely to resort to income activities with low risk and low average return.1 
 
                                                       
1  See  e.g.  Eswaran  and  Kotwal  (1990),  Morduch  (1990),  Rosenzweig  and  Binswanger 
(1993), Dercon (1996) and Lamb (2002) and Wadood and Lamb (2006). 2  Can a social safety net affect farmers’ crop portfolios?  
 
A social safety net is likely to have a similar effect on the production 
pattern. If farmers know that they will at least reach the subsistence level 
of consumption – even if there is a bad year in production – they may be 
more willing to engage in activities with a higher average return and higher 
risk. However, few, if any, studies have been made in this field.  
 
The  effects  of  a  social  safety  net  on  crop  production  are,  however, 
ambiguous and are likely to depend on how that net is designed. In many 
developing  countries,  especially  in  sub-Saharan  Africa,  safety  nets  are 
designed so that participants in programmes are assured of a minimum 
level of food or money in exchange for work in social programmes during 
a given period – which is the case with the programme studied in this 
paper.  When  the  safety  net  is  designed  in  this  manner,  a  number  of 
possible effects it may have on the value, risk and composition of farmers’ 
crop portfolios can be identified.  
 
The insurance function of such programmes may not only lead farmers to 
choose a crop portfolio that contains a larger share of crops with higher 
value and risk (which in turn affect the value and risk of the total crop 
portfolio),  it  can  also  increase  labour  productivity  by  ensuring  that 
household  members  have  adequate  food  and  nutrition  throughout  the 
year. The increased labour productivity can directly increase the output 
(and, hence, the total value of the crop portfolio) and reduce the variation 
in output at the same time. 
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The  safety  net  can  also  affect  the  availability  of  inputs  by  reducing 
liquidity constraints (so that farmers can more easily purchase inputs), but 
also by competing with labour use in own farming. These changes in input 
availability  can  directly  affect  both  the  output  and  variation  in  it.  For 
example, if more capital is available to make investments at the beginning 
of the season, it may increase the output and reduce the variation; on the 
other hand, if farmers are employed in public work during times that are 
critical for crop production on the farmer’s own farm, there is a risk of 
reduced  output  and  increased  variation  in  output.  The  availability  of 
inputs  may  also  affect  the  relative  attractiveness  of  growing  different 
crops,  depending  on  their  relative  input  intensities.  It  is,  for  example, 
likely that crops that are more capital-intensive but less labour-intensive 
become  more  attractive.  Again,  the  resulting  reallocation of  land  to 
different crops can indirectly affect the value and variation of the total 
crop portfolio. 
 
Another possible effect of the safety net is that, if workers are paid in 
food, it can crowd out local food production by increasing the supply of 
food and suppressing the prices of food crops.  
 
Thus, depending on the design of the programme, there can be several 
different types of effects on agricultural production, and the net impact is 
not clear. 
 
The  effect  of  food-for-work  (FFW)  programmes  on  agricultural 
production is an ongoing debate and the empirical results are mixed (see 4  Can a social safety net affect farmers’ crop portfolios?  
 
e.g. Bezu and Holden (2008) and Barrett et al. (2004)). The main focus in 
the literature has been on the effects of these programmes on output and 
input usage, while less attention has been given to the effects on risk and 
composition of the crop portfolio. Bezuneh et al. (1988) is an exception: 
they use linear programming to study the effects of FFW on agricultural 
production in rural Kenya. Their results indicate that participation in FFW 
programmes can shift agricultural production from maize to millet, where 
millet is the more profitable crop. However, to our knowledge, there has 
been  no  study  to  date  of  how  FFW  programmes  affect  risk  in  crop 
portfolios. This paper is an attempt to fill that gap. 
 
The  rest  of  the  paper  is  organised  as  follows:  section  2  describes  the 
programme studied in this paper. Section 3 outlines a brief theoretical 
model  of  how  the  programme  studied  can  affect  the  riskiness  of  and 
return  to  the  total  crop  portfolio  and  the  composition  of  the  crop 
portfolio. Section 4 presents the empirical models. Section 5 describes the 
data. Section 6 presents the results and section 7 sets out the conclusions 
for the study.  
 
2  The Productive Safety Net Programme 
 
The safety net programme of interest in this paper is the Productive Safety 
Net Programme (PSNP) in Ethiopia. It is the largest social protection 
programme in the history of sub-Saharan Africa, with the exception of 
South Africa. The annual budget is near US$500 million, and it reaches 
more than 7 million Ethiopians (Gilligan et al. 2008). The programme was Can a social safety net affect farmers’ crop portfolios?   5 
 
launched by the government and a number of donors2 in 2005 with the 
aim of combating the persistent problem of food insecurity in Ethiopia. 
The general idea of the programme is to provide food -insecure people 
with  public  works  that will generate a small but secure income.  Such 
works differ from region to region, but it aims at generating public goods 
such as roads and stone terraces. The extra income generated from these  
works is intended to ensure  that the participants can maintain at least a 
minimum level of consumption, and enable them to keep their productive 
assets in times of income shocks rather than selling them. It should be 
emphasised that the main purpose of the programme is not to affect the 
value, risk or composition of the crop portfolio.  Even though such 
impacts are not an explicit programme goal, impacts on the crop portfolio 
will, of course, matter in respect of the programme’s overarching aims and 
deserve to be studied, therefore. 
 
The basic targeting criteria for eligibility to the PSNP are that – 
  the  household  should  have  faced  continuous  food  shortages 
during the most recent three years 
  have suddenly become food insecure, and/or 
  lack  family  support  or  other  means  of  social  protection  or 
support. 
 
                                                       
2 Including the World Bank, the United States Agency for International Development, the 
Canadian International Development Agency, and several European donors. 6  Can a social safety net affect farmers’ crop portfolios?  
 
Factors that are mentioned as indicators are –3 
  “status of households’ assets; land holdings, quality of land, food 
stock, etc 
  income  from  non-agricultural  activities  and  alternative 
employment[, and] 
  support/remittances from relatives or community”. 
 
There are two previous comprehensive studies of effects of the PSNP: 
Gilligan and Hoddinott (2008) and Andersson et al. (2010). Andersson et 
al. (2010) study the effects of the programme on asset holdings. They find 
that the programme increases investment in tree holdings, which are less 
liquid assets, while no effects on livestock holdings are found. Gilligan 
and Hoddinott (2008) study the effect of the programme on a number of 
variables.  Of special  interest for  this study  are  the  variables  related  to 
agricultural production. They find no significant effect of the PSNP alone 
on the use of improved seed or fertiliser, but report a significant increase 
in the usage of the two inputs when the joint impact of PSNP and other 
food security programmes (where the major part is provision of credit) are 
considered. 
 
Section 3 presents a theoretical framework for how the PSNP can affect 
the composition of the crop portfolio, on the one hand, and the mean and 
variability of the total crop portfolio on the other. 
                                                       
3 MoARD (2006). Can a social safety net affect farmers’ crop portfolios?   7 
 
3  Theoretical background 
 
The theoretical framework in this paper is mainly based on the model 
presented  by  Rosenzweig  and  Binswanger  (1993),  but  includes  some 
minor extensions to fit the current context. The PSNP has two features 
that  are  important  to  incorporate  in  the  model.  The  first  is  that  the 
programme can reduce how much of the variation in profit spills over to 
variation in consumption. This will happen if the programme acts as a 
safety net and ensures that consumption never falls below a level derived 
from the incomes from the programme – even if there is a bad year in 
agricultural production. The implication of this feature is the same as that 
derived by Rosenzweig and Binswanger (1993), although they consider the 
impact  of  wealth  rather  than  the  impact  of  participation  in  a  social 
protection programme. The second feature, which represents an extension 
of the original model, is that the programme can affect the availability of 
inputs. It is assumed that the programme can either increase or decrease 
input availability, depending on whether it reduces liquidity constraints 
(which would increase input availability) or competes for labour (which 
would reduce input availability).4 
 
The  farmer’s  expected  utility  is  assumed  to  depend  on  the  first  two 
moments of consumption, according to – 
 
                                                       
4 In reality there are, of course, a number of additional factors that affect the mean and 
variance of profit, such as input and output price variability. We abstract from this in order 
to keep the model as simple as possible. 8  Can a social safety net affect farmers’ crop portfolios?  
 
    (1) 
 
where   is mean consumption and   is the variation in consumption, 
and  where    and  .  Consumption  is  assumed  to  be  derived 
from  profits  in  crop  production  and  income  from  the  PSNP.  The 
relationship  between  consumption  and  profit  is  determined  in  the 
following way: 
 
     (2) 
    (3) 
Here,  and   are the mean and variation in profit. P is participation in 
the  PSNP,  and  is  here  seen  as  a  continuous  variable  to  simplify  the 
analysis. c  is consumption-derived from the income received from the 
work in the programme. k can be seen as a measure of how much of the 
variation in profit spills over in variation in consumption with  . 
Furthermore,  it  is  assumed  that  .  This  means  that  programme 
participation is assumed to act as a buffer and reduce the transmission of 
variation in profit to variation in consumption. The mean and variation in 
profit is assumed to be determined according to the following: 
 
    (4) 
    (5) Can a social safety net affect farmers’ crop portfolios?   9 
 
where   is a vector of crop composition, and   is the share 
of land devoted to crop i . X is the availability of inputs which is assumed 
to be exogenously determined and depends on programme participation. 
 
To derive the effects of the programme on the crop portfolio we assume, 
for the sake of simplicity, that the expected utility function is additively 
separable in   and  . This implies that the farmers’ expected utility can 
be written as follows: 
 
    (6) 
Again for the sake of simplicity, it is assumed that there are only two types 
of crops, 1 and 2. The total amount of land is assumed to be fixed and is 
set to unity, so that  . This means that the Lagrange function 






The first-order conditions are given by – 
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From these first-order conditions, it follows that –  
    (9) 
Here,  and   are the marginal contribution from land allocated to crop 
j to the mean and variability of profit, respectively. From equation (9) it 
can be seen that, if crop 1 has a relatively higher return in optimum, i.e. 
,  then  it  also  has  a  relatively  high  risk,  i.e.  . 
Hence,  there  is  a  positive  relationship  between  a  crop’s  marginal 
contribution  to  the  mean  profit  and  its  marginal  contribution  to  the 
variability in profit. 
 
The effects of programme participation on the share of land allocated to 
the  relatively  more  profitable  and  risky  crop, ,  is  obtained  by  total 
differentiation of (8), and the use of Cramer’s rule. This produces –  
 
 
  (10) 
 
The  denominator  is  positive  from  the  second  order  condition  for 
maximisation. Hence, how a change in programme participation will alter 
the amount of land allocated to the more profitable and more risky crop 
will depend on – 
  how the programme affects availability of inputs, which in turn 
affects the marginal profitability and risk of land devoted to each 
crop, and Can a social safety net affect farmers’ crop portfolios?   11 
 
  how  much  the  programme  reduces  the  transmission  of  profit 
variation to consumption variation. 
 
In  other  words,  if  the  programme  only  smoothes  variation  in 
consumption,  increased  programme  participation  would  lead  to  an 
increase  in  the  production  of  high-return,  high-risk  crops,  and  would 
thereby  increase  the  average  value  and  risk  of  the  crop  portfolio. 
However, programme participation can also alter the composition of the 
crop  portfolio  by  altering  the  differences  in  marginal  return  and  risk 
between crops. In this case, the PSNP’s effect on the composition of the 
crop portfolio and on its average return and risk is ambiguous, and is 
likely to depend on the relative input intensities of different crops.  
 
The effects of the PSNP on the mean and risk of the total crop portfolio 
are given by total differentiation of (4) and (5). This gives the following: 
 
 
  (11) 
 
  (12) 
 
The sign of   depends on whether the programme increases 
or  decreases  the  availability  of  inputs,  and  the sign of    
depends on whether the resulting changes in inputs are risk-increasing or 
risk-decreasing.  The  signs  of  and   12  Can a social safety net affect farmers’ crop portfolios?  
 
depend  on  how  the  programme  alters  the  composition  of  the  crop 
portfolio. 
 
As  can  be  seen  from  the  brief  theoretical  exercise  above,  the  overall 
effects of the PSNP on the composition of the crop portfolio and the 
average return and risk in crop production can go in either direction, and 
cannot  be  determined  on  theoretical  grounds  alone.  Hence,  empirical 
analysis is needed to determine the direction. 
 
4  Empirical analysis 
 
We use two empirical models to examine how farmers’ crop portfolios 
have changed due to the PSNP. In the first model, we investigate whether 
the programme has altered the value and risk of the crop portfolio. In the 
second model, we investigate whether the programme has brought about 
changes in the land devoted to each crop. The two models are presented 
in detail below. 
 
Before starting the empirical analysis, the inherent problem of evaluation 
studies should briefly be addressed. The problem arises from the fact that 
we can never know what the outcome would have been if the farmers had 
not participated in the programme. One way to approach this lack of 
information  is  to  look  at what  has  happened  to  farmers  who  did  not 
participate in the programme. When one compares the two groups, it is 
important  to  control  for  variables  that  determine  selection  into  the 
programme and that can, at the same time, affect the outcome; if one does Can a social safety net affect farmers’ crop portfolios?   13 
 
not  control  for  these  variables,  there  is  a  risk  that  the  difference  in 
outcome between the groups is not due to programme participation but to 
differences in the characteristics of the households in the two groups. The 
rich data set that we have at hand (described in section 5) allows us to 
control for a wide range of variables such as household characteristics, 
plot  characteristics,  and  input  usage.  In  addition,  the  programme 
implementation  manual  is  a  good  guide  on  what  makes  a  household 
eligible  for  participation  in  the  programme  (see  section  2).  There  is, 
however,  still  a  risk  that  unobserved  variables  affect  both  programme 
participation and the outcome variables. To control for such unobserved 
effects, we make use of the panel data at hand. The panel data methods 
used to solve the problem differ somewhat between the two models, and 
are therefore presented as part of the description of each model. 
 
It can be argued that there is a risk of simultaneity between composition, 
value  and  risk  of  the  crop  portfolio  on  the  one  hand,  and  PSNP 
participation  on  the  other.  For  example,  the  farmer  who  has  taken 
considerable risk in his crop portfolio and has suffered large losses in 
output might be more eligible for the programme than one who has not; 
or  that  households  who  have  only  undertaken  low-risk,  low-yield  low 
return activities suffer from food shortages, and it is this that makes them 
eligible. However, this risk of simultaneity is unlikely because most of the 
participants were selected to the programme before the effects on the 
composition, value and risk of the crop portfolio were observed. 
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2.1  Model 1 – Mean and variance of crop yield in the total crop 
portfolio 
 
In order to examine how the PSNP affects the value and risk of the crop 
portfolio,  we  follow  the  method  suggested  by  Kumbhakar  (1993)  and 
specify a production function given by the following: 
 
    (13) 
 
where y is the total value of output per hectare produced by household h 
at  time  t;  x  is  a  vector  of  independent  variables  including  a  dummy 
variable  indicating  programme  participation;    and    are  parameter 
vectors; and   is a random variable with mean 0 and variance 1. This is 
an adaptation of a model originally attributed to Just and Pope (1978). 
These  types  of  models  have  frequently  been  used  in  agricultural 
economics to study production risks5 and they specifically encompass the 
possibility that an input can be both risk-increasing and risk-decreasing.  
  
Equation (13) can be rewritten to yield the following:  
 
    (14) 
                                                       
5 For later applications and extensions, see e.g. Wan et al. (1992), Kumbhakar (1993), Hurd 
(1994), Traxler et al. (1995), Battese et al. (1997), Tveterås (1999, 2000), Kumbhakar and 
Tsionas (2002), and Di Falco and Chavas (2006). Can a social safety net affect farmers’ crop portfolios?   15 
 
This  implies  that  ,  and  . 
Hence, by including PSNP participation as an explanatory variable, the 
effects of the PSNP on both the mean value and the variation in this value 
of can be estimated.  Based on a number of tests, as described later, the 
final model considered in this paper is specified as follows (subscripts h 






where  x  indicates  inputs  to  production;  z  indicates  other  explanatory 
variables, including participation in PSNP; and k , l  and m are indexes 
denoting the different inputs and other explanatory variables. 
 
The model is estimated in two steps. In the first, the mean value function 
is estimated by regressing the logarithm of total value of output on the set 
of explanatory variables (ignoring the variance function). In the second 
step, the variance function is estimated by taking the logarithm of the 
squared residuals from the first step and regressing them on the same set 
of variables. The fact that that the error term is a function of the input 
variables implies that the regression is subject to heteroscedasticity. To 
deal with this problem, the mean function is estimated by weighted least 16  Can a social safety net affect farmers’ crop portfolios?  
 
squares, where  are used as weights and the variance function is 
estimated with robust standard errors. 
 
To deal with the problem of selection into the PSNP on variables that are 
unobserved  but  are  time-invariant,  the  production  function  can  be 
estimated with a fixed effect approach (Tveterås, 1999). However, this 
method has the disadvantage that, when the data consist of only two time 
periods, then . This means that the variation in the dependent 
variable in the variance function, which is the natural logarithm of the 
squared  residuals,  is  limited  when  one  uses  the  fixed  effect  approach. 
Therefore, we chose to test only if the results in the mean value function 
were  different  when  fixed  effect  was  used,  in  comparison  with  using 
pooled Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). The explanatory variables used are 
described in section 5. These include variable inputs used in production, 
plot characteristics, and household characteristics. They are similar to the 
explanatory variables used by Kassie et al. (2008) when yield equations in 
rural Ethiopia were estimated. 
 
2.2  Model 2: Acreage response of different crops 
 
When one estimates the effects of PSNP on the land allocated to different 
crops,  a number  of  issues need  to  be  considered  before  choosing  the 
econometric model. The first issue is that many farmers do not grow all 
the possible crops, which means that the dependent variable is zero for a 
large fraction of the population and continuous for the remaining fraction. 
 Can a social safety net affect farmers’ crop portfolios?   17 
 
The second econometric issue, as discussed before, is that there is a risk 
that farmers are selected into the PSNP based on variables that are that 
are not observed (implying that there are unobserved variables that are 
correlated with the independent variables). If farmers that participate in 
the programme differ from those who do not in some aspect that we 
cannot observe, the estimated impact of participation may be biased. 
 
The  third  econometric  issue  that  arises  is  that  there  may  be  dynamic 
effects in the choice of crops. Dynamic effects can occur if, for example, a 
rotational crop system is used, which would imply that the probability of 
growing a specific crop during one year decreases if the same crop was 
grown during the previous season. Dynamic effects can also occur if there 
is some learning involved in the process which would imply a positive 
correlation between crop choices over the years. 
 
To deal with the first issue, namely the truncated dependent variable, a 
number of different approaches have been suggested. These include the 
Type I Tobit Model (Tobin, 1956; Amemiya 1985), the Type II Tobit 
Model  (Amemiya,  1985),  and  the  Two-part  Model  (Cragg,  1971).  The 
Type I Tobit Model has the disadvantage that the same mechanism that 
determines whether or not farmers grow a specific crop is also assumed to 
determine how much land they allocate to that crop. Both the Type II 
Tobit Model  and  the  Two-part  Model  account  for  the  fact  that  these 
decisions can actually be two separate mechanisms. The Type II Tobit 
Model, unlike the Two-part Model, accounts for the fact that there can be 
a problem of sample selection in the crop choice, i.e. some unobserved 18  Can a social safety net affect farmers’ crop portfolios?  
 
variables  that  affect  the  decision  to  grow  a  specific  crop  and  that  are 
correlated with determinants of how much land to allocate to that crop. 
However, the Type II Tobit Model has the disadvantage that it is often 
difficult to identify the parameters in the model. Therefore, we chose to 
use the Two-part Model and test for the existence of sample selection in 
crop choice (which would make the Type II Tobit Model preferable). 
 
The Two-part Model is specified as a lognormal hurdle model (Cragg, 
1971). This means that the decision whether or not to grow a specific 
crop is assumed to be governed by a Probit Model and the land allocated 
to a specific crop (conditional on the crop being grown by the farmer, and 
on  a  set  of  explanatory  variables)  are  assumed  to  follow  a  lognormal 
distribution. The model can then be written as – 
   
  (16) 
 
where   is the land allocated to crop c by household h at time t;   is a 
binary variable that is 1 if the crop was planted, and 0 if not; and   is a log 
normally distributed variable measuring the land allocated to that specific 
crop. As we assume that there may be unobserved variables (discussed as 
the second econometrical issue above) and that the probability of growing 
a specific crop may depend on whether or not it was grown during the 
previous season (discussed as the third econometrical issue above), the 
final model is specified as – 






where x is a set of explanatory variables;  and   are parameters to be 
estimated;   and   are household-specific, time-invariant, unobserved 
effects;  and    and    are  error  terms  that  are  assumed  to  be 
independent of each other.   is assumed to follow standard normal 
distribution, and   is assumed to be normally distributed with mean 0 
and variance  . 
 
To  deal  with  the  dynamic  structure  and  unobserved  effects  that  are 
potentially correlated with the independent variable in the first – or probit 
– part of the model, we use a method suggested by Wooldridge (2002). 
We assume that the unobserved effect is a function of the mean value of 
the independent variables and the initial value according to – 
 
    (18) 
where   is the average of   over t;   is the observation of   at time 
zero; and   is assumed to be normally distributed with mean  0 and 
standard deviation  . This implies that 
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The model can now be estimated with the standard random effects probit 
estimation.  The  intuition  behind  this  method  is  that  the  effect  of  a 
variable is estimated while holding the time average of the variable fixed. 
In the case of the PSNP variable used here, the time-averaged variable 
controls  for  the  fact  that  it  is  a  specific  group  of  farmers  who  are 
participating in the programme, while the time-varying variable measures 
the effect of these farmers going from not participating in the programme 
to participating in it. 
 






for two different values of  , and then calculating the difference. 
 
In the second part of the model, time-invariant unobserved effects are 
removed by the standard fixed-effects approach. Since the same variables 
are used for all the individual crops, efficiency could not be gained by 
estimating the equations simultaneously (see e.g. Greene, 2008:257). To 
test for unobserved variables that affect the decision to grow a specific 
crop, and that are correlated with determinants of how much land to 
allocate to that crop, we used a test suggested by Wooldridge (1995). This 
test can be seen as an extension to Heckman’s (1976) test applied to a Can a social safety net affect farmers’ crop portfolios?   21 
 
panel data context. The test is conducted by first estimating the inverse 
Mills lambda from the probability of growing a crop in each time period; 
the inverse Mills lambda is then used as an independent variable, after 
which the model is estimated with a fixed-effect estimation on the positive 
sample. 
 
Both parts of the model, i.e. the probability of growing a specific crop and 
the land allocated to that crop, are assumed to depend on both household 
and  farm  characteristics.  This  is  in  line  with  Benin  et  al.  (2004),  who 
studied  the  economic  determinants  of  crop  diversity  in  the  Ethiopian 
highlands. Crop choice is also likely to depend on the inputs available to 
the household. For example, if a household is abundant in family labour, 
it is more likely to plant a labour-intensive crop – especially if the labour 
market  is  not  functioning  perfectly.  We  chose  to  control  for  inputs 
employed in production at the household level, as we assume that inputs 
used in crop production are fixed in the short term at the household level, 
but flexible between plots. 
 
Note that input prices are not included in the model, which is typically the 
case in supply functions. This is a limitation in our study and is due to lack 
of data. However, each farmer lives in one of three districts and prices do 
not normally differ much between farmers in the same district; hence, the 
regional dummies can be assumed to capture variation due to different 
prices. 
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5  Data 
 
The  data  used  in  this  paper  were  collected  through  four  rounds  of 
household surveys. These were conducted in 1999, 2002, 2005 and 2007 
in 14 sites in East Gojam and South Wollo zones of the Amhara Region 
of  Ethiopia.  The  surveys  were  performed  in  collaboration  with  the 
Departments of Economics at Addis Ababa University, the University of 
Gothenburg, and the World Bank. From these surveys we use data that 
contain  information  about  crop  production,  input  usage,  plot 
characteristics, household characteristics, and regional dummies. 
 
The larger household surveys were supplemented by a PSNP survey in 
2008. In this latter survey, the farmers covered in the previous surveys 
were asked about their participation in the PSNP between 2005 – the year 
the PSNP was launched – and 2007. The PSNP survey only covered the 
sites  in  the  South  Wollo  zone,  as  these  were  the  only  ones  from  the 
previous surveys that were covered by the PSNP. As the zones differ by 
agricultural conditions, we only make use of the South Wollo sample in 
our analysis.  
 
In all models described above, we use the data from the PSNP survey and 
the 2005 and 2007 household surveys. In the acreage response models we 
also  use  data  from  the  1999  and  2002  surveys  as  lagged  dependent 
variables. 
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Before the data were used in the analysis, some of the observations were 
removed  from  the  sample.  Plots  that  lacked  information  about  the 
variables of interest and households that reported extreme outliers for one 
or more of the output or input variables used were not included in the 
analysis. The outliers were detected for each variable separately by using 
the test suggested by Hadi (1992, 1994). The original sample comprised 
1,202 observations; after the outliers had been removed, the remaining 
sample consisted of 1,088 observations. The data set does not contain 
specific  information  about  output  prices;  however,  it  does  contain 
information about revenue from crop sales and quantities sold. By using 
this information, the price for each crop was calculated at the sample 
mean, after extreme outliers had been removed. Some of the crops were 
grown for own consumption only, and were not sold by any farmers in 
the  sample;  hence,  price  information  for  these  crops  is  lacking.  This 
problem  concerns  less  than  0.5%  of  the  plots  in  the  final  sample. 
Consequently, we only use plots that were planted with a crop that at least 
one farmer in the sample sold during the period. 
 
Tables 1 and 2 in Appendix A present a description of the crop patterns 
in 2005 and 2007 for the sample used in the analysis. As can be seen in 
Table 1, Cereals was the crop category grown by most farmers, and to 
which most of the land was allocated during both years. The land share 
allocated to cereals was somewhat reduced in 2007. The crop category 
Perennials had the highest production value as well as standard deviation 
during both years, and showed a large increase in the number of growers 
from 2005 to 2007. As can be seen in Table 2, teff was the cereal grown 24  Can a social safety net affect farmers’ crop portfolios?  
 
by most farmers during both years. Zengada had the highest production 
value per hectare in 2005, while teff had the highest production value in 
2007. 
 
Table 3 in Appendix A describes the dependent variables in the different 
models. The dependent variable in the mean function in Model 1 is the 
value of production per household per hectare for the total crop portfolio. 
This is an aggregated measure of the value of all crops that a household 
produces. As mentioned above, the prices are calculated as the sample 
mean  price  received  for  the  output  sold.  The  prices  are  measured  in 
nominal terms, but since a time dummy variable is included, inflation will 
not bias the results. As regards teff, the survey asked about three different 
varieties: white, black and mixed. As the three varieties generate different 
prices, the value of teff is the sum of price multiplied by the quantity for 
each of the three varieties. The dependent variable in the acreage response 
models is the land devoted to each crop. 
  
Table 4 in Appendix A describes the independent variables used in the 
analysis. The variables are described for both PSNP participants and non-
participants. The programme’s launch in 2005 means that, by the time the 
last larger household survey was conducted in 2007, the households could 
potentially have participated for three years already: 2005, 2006 and 2007. 
In this paper, PSNP participation is defined as participation during 2006 
and/or 2007. This is in order to make the PSNP variable correspond to 
the household survey data that were collected in May–June 2007, and that 
contain questions concerning production and household status during the Can a social safety net affect farmers’ crop portfolios?   25 
 
last year. Although the 2005 survey was conducted during the first year of 
the PSNP, the programme began after farmers had already made their 
planting  decisions  for  that  season.  For  this  reason,  programme 
participation  in  2005  was set  to  0  for  all  households.  The  rest  of  the 
independent  variables  can  be  classified  into  three  categories:  Family 
characteristics,  Farm  characteristics  and  Inputs  in  production.  All  variables  are 
measured  at  the  household  level.  The  family  characteristics  are 
straightforward. The dummy variables for farm characteristics (soil quality, 
slope and fertility) are set to 1 if the farm had any plot with the specified 
characteristics. The same applies to the dummy variables used for inputs 
in  production,  i.e.  the  dummy  variables  for  manure,  improved  seeds, 
irrigation, and fertiliser are set to 1 if the household employed that specific 
input on the farm. The Labour variable is defined as the number of man 
days of family labour employed per hectare on the farmer’s own land. 
Traction is defined as the number of days that some means of ploughing 
was used per hectare on the plot.6 The other variables are self-explanatory. 
 
As can be noted, there are many variables that can be important for the 
outcome. This is something that needs to be considered before specifying 
the  models.  The  drawback  of  including  too  many  variables  in  the 
empirical analysis is that the variance increases and, hence, there is a risk 
that  a variable that actually affects the outcome becomes insignificant. 
However, if variables  that are important for the outcome are omitted 
from the model, the estimated parameters will be biased. We therefore 
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chose to report the regression results from the full model, including all of 
the  variables,  as  our  main  results,  while  the  results  from  models  that 
include fewer variables are reported in footnotes. 
 
6  Results 
 
The results from estimations of the mean value and variance functions for 
the entire crop portfolio are presented in Table 5 in Appendix A. The 
results from the mean value function are based on pooled cross-section 
Weighted  Least  Squares  (WLS)  estimates  of  Translog  mean  value 
functions. This model specification is selected based on two sets of tests. 
Firstly, tests for functional form indicate that the Translog specification is 
preferred to the Cobb-Douglas specification, which in turn is preferred to 
the linear specification. Secondly, tests for unobserved effects indicate no 
significant  fixed  or  random  effects.7  The  results  from  the  variance 
function are based on a model where the logged squared residuals from 
the  mean  value  function  are  used  as  the  dependent  variable  and  the 
independent variables are the same as in the mean value function – with 
the exception of squared and cross-product of input variables.8  
 
As can be seen in Table 5 in Appendix A, PSNP is insignificant in both 
the mean value function and in the variance function. This means that 
                                                       
7 An F test where under H0, all time invariant fixed effect = 0 gives F(556, 429) = 1.09 
Prob > F = 0.1745. The Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for random effects 
gives chi2(1) = 0.28 Prob > chi2 = 0.5940. 
8 An F test where H 0 is that squared inputs and the cross-product of inputs = 0 gives F 
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PSNP participation does not seem to significantly alter the mean value or 
risk in the total crop portfolio, which was one of the main questions of 
this paper. 
 
In order to assess the validity of the model, it is also important to examine 
how other variables affect the mean value and variance. As can be seen, all 
variables  that  are  used  either  have  the  signs  expected  from  economic 
theory or are insignificant. In the mean value function, the production 
inputs  Labour  and  Traction  seem  to  significantly  increase  the  value  of 
production. In addition, as can be seen from the significant negative sign 
for squared labour and traction these inputs seem to increase the value of 
production at a decreasing rate. Furthermore, education seems to increase 
the  value  of  production.  All  of  these  results  are  in  line  with  what  is 
normally expected from economic theory. The total number of livestock 
owned by the household, which can be seen as an indicator of wealth, also 
seems to significantly increase the value of production. From the time 
dummy variable, we see that the nominal value of production increased 
between the two years in question. There also seems to be a significant 
difference  in  production  value  between  regions.  Black  soil  seems  to 
reduce the mean value of output, while flat land seems to increase it. It is 
also interesting to note that no significant effect from access to credit can 
be seen.9  
 
                                                       
9 Exactly the same parameter estimates are significant when using a stepwise approach, 
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In the variance function, the number of hectares as well as the usage of 
manure seems to reduce the variation in output, while modern fertiliser 
seems to increase the variation.10 These are  standard results in the risk 
literature. In general, few variables are significant in the variance function, 
and the R2 for this model is low. 
 
The  results  from  the  acreage  response  models  are  presented  through 
Table 6 to Table 10 in Appendix A. The test for the existence of sample 
selection  in  crop  choice  (some  unobserved  variables  that  affect  the 
decision to grow a specific crop and that are correlated with determinants 
of how much land to allocate to that crop) indicates no such problem for 
any of the crops except pulses.11 Hence, the Two-part Model is considered 
preferable.  
 
The results from the first parts of the acreage response model, the Probit 
Models, are presented in Tables 6 and 7, while the average partial effects 
are  presented  in  Table  8.  The  results  suggest  that  the  PSNP  has 
significantly increased the probability of  growing perennials and wheat, 
while it has decreased the probability of growing zengada.12 Looking at the 
average partial effects, it can be seen that the effect of PSNP participation 
on the probability of growing perennials is the highest. The results from 
the second part of the  acreage response model, i.e. the continuous part 
                                                       
10 ibid. 
11 The tests are available from the author upon request. 
12  For the crops for which PSNP is insignificant, Stepwise Probit Models  –  where 
insignificant variables are removed backwards – were also tested. The programme effect 
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that is estimated with a standard fixed effect approach, are presented in 
Table  9  and  10.  These  estimates  reveal  that  the PSNP  seems  to  have 
increased the land allocated to perennials, but reduced the land allocated 
to pulses and teff. 
 
7  Discussion 
 
The aim of this paper was to study the effects of a social safety net on the 
mean  value  and  risk  in  agricultural  production.  This  is  an  important 
question as it is often believed that a lack of opportunities to manage risk 
ex post traps farmers in low-risk, low-return activities.  
 
In this paper, two questions have been raised: 
  Has the PSNP altered the value and risk in the crop portfolio? 
  Has there been a change in the composition of the crop portfolio 
toward higher-value and higher-risk crops?      
 
The results suggest that the PSNP has brought about some changes in the 
farmers’ choice of farming activities. The largest effect is found on the 
choice to grow perennials, and on the land allocated to them. Perennials 
have  longer  planning  horizons,  have  a  higher  value,  and  have  higher 
variability than other crops grown by the farmers in this sample. Hence, 
this result is in line with  the findings in previous studies, namely that 
increased  possibilities  to  ex-post  smooth  consumption  in  times  of 
negative income shocks lead to less income skewing in favour of low-risk, 30  Can a social safety net affect farmers’ crop portfolios?  
 
low-return  activities.  The  result  is  also  in  line  with  the  results  in 
Andersson et al. (2010), where it was found that the PSNP had increased 
the plantation of trees. The authors in the latter study conclude that the 
result can be  ascribed to the programme giving farmers the option to 
forgo  income  from  annual  plants,  and  instead  grow  crops  that  take  a 
longer time to mature. Perhaps the same effects are at work in the current 
study. There also seem to be some other minor changes in the probability 
of growing, and land allocated to, different crops that are not as easily 
traced back to any specific risk-return pattern. 
 
No significant result could be found on the mean value and risk in the 
total crop portfolio. This lack of significant result can be explained by the 
programme  not  having  any  major  influence  on  variables  that  are 
important for agricultural production. Another reason might be that there 
are effects that offset each other. In the theoretical model, a number of 
effects are seen to be at work. It is suggested that a change in mean value 
and risk in the crop portfolio could be brought about not only by changes 
in the composition of crop portfolio, but also through changes in the 
availability of inputs. In the empirical analysis, we control for input usage; 
hence, the results are for a given level of input. We cannot control for the 
timing or quality of input, however. The programme can either improve 
the timing of inputs (if it reduces liquidity constraints and makes it easier 
to buy the right inputs at the right time) or worsen the timing of inputs (if 
the farmers are stuck in public work when they are needed the most for 
on-farm work). It can also affect the quality of labour input by providing Can a social safety net affect farmers’ crop portfolios?   31 
 
food  during  the  lean  season  so  that  farmers  are  better  fed  when  the 
sowing season begins.  
 
Notably, the last of the main surveys on which this study was based was 
conducted after the programme had only been in operation for two years; 
hence, it may be too early to say much about the programme’s longer-
term effects. That farmers participating in the PSNP are growing more 
high-value perennials appears not to have had any impact on the overall 
value of their crop portfolios thus far; however, when the plants have had 
time to mature, the impact on the mean value may increase. The results of 
the PSNP that are already starting to show are interesting from a policy 
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Appendix A. Tables 






Average share of land  Average production value 
in Birr per hectare 
Year  2005  2007  2005  2007  2005  2007 
Cereal  531  534  0.81  0.72  2,260  2,791 
      (0.25)  (0.26)  (1,637)  (1,810) 
Perennial  33  266  0.02  0.12  4,131  4,000 
      (0.09)  (0.19)  (2,569)  (5,392) 
Pulses   234  265  0.16  0.14  1,433  2,864 
      (0.23)  (0.19)  (945)  (2,357) 
Other (fruits,  
oilseed, spices) 
44  79  0.01  0.02  1,407  3,710 
    (0.06)  (0.06)  (1,184)  (2,405) 
Note: Standard deviations are within parentheses. 
 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics by cereal type 
Cereal  
type 
Number of growing 
households 
Average share of 
cereal land 
Average production value 
in Birr per hectare 
 
Year  2005  2007  2005  2007  2005  2007 
Barley  95  127  0.06  0.07  1571  1751 
      (0.18)  (0.17)  (1217)  (1401) 
Maize  131  142  0.06  0.07  1155  1604 
      (0.16)  (0.17)  (867)  (1515) 
Sorghum  165  178  0.19  0.19  2500  2536 
      (0.32)  (0.31)  (1603)  (1550) 
Teff  380  404  0.37  0.38  2251  3880 
      (0.32)  (0.31)  (1710)  (2666) 
Wheat  151  187  0.14  0.14  2111  2409 
      (0.27)  (0.24)  (1722)  (1701) 
Zengada  149  125  0.15  0.12  3348  3170 




85  88  0.02  0.02  10424  2193 
    (0.07)  (0.07)  (40239)  (1433) 
Note: Standard deviations are within parentheses. Can a social safety net affect farmers’ crop portfolios?   37 
 
 
Table 3: Descriptive statistics of the dependent variables  
Variables  Obs.  Mean  Std Dev.  Min.  Max. 
Value (in Birr per hectare) of total crop 
portfolio  1088  2184  1379  0  7462 
Land (in hectares) allocated to: 
Cereals  1088  0.652  0.656  0  9.918 
Perennials  1088  0.045  0.107  0  1.236 
Pulses  1088  0.143  0.347  0  8.024 
Other categories  1088  0.017  0.063  0  0.733 
Barley  1088  0.042  0.120  0  2.000 
Maize  1088  0.034  0.120  0  2.000 
Sorghum  1088  0.158  0.330  0  4.000 
Teff  1088  0.263  0.427  0  6.598 
Wheat  1088  0.079  0.165  0  2.199 
Zengada  1088  0.062  0.176  0  3.172 
Other cereals  1088  0.014  0.093  0  2.500 
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Table 4: Descriptive statistics of the independent variables  
Variable  Non-participants  Participants 
Obs.  Mean  Std Dev.  Obs.  Mean  Std Dev. 
Household characteristics             
Credit access  683  0.732  0.443  405  0.714  0.453 
Family size  683  6.095  2.305  405  5.825  2.041 
Sex of head of household  676  0.880  0.325  397  0.783  0.412 
Education of head of 
household 
682  1.233  2.755  405  1.274  2.632 
Livestock  683  3.631  2.208  405  2.819  1.793 
Remittance  683  0.141  0.348  405  0.151  0.358 
Corrugated roof  683  0.625  0.484  405  0.383  0.487 
No. of adult males  683  1.849  1.062  405  1.674  0.976 
No. of adult females  683  1.647  0.903  405  1.546  0.771 
Farm characteristics             
Fertile (soil quality)  683  0.763  0.426  405  0.840  0.368 
Infertile (soil quality)  683  0.139  0.346  405  0.121  0.327 
Black (soil colour)  683  0.767  0.423  405  0.778  0.416 
Red (soil colour)  683  0.611  0.488  405  0.657  0.475 
Flat (slope)  683  0.878  0.327  405  0.951  0.217 
Steep (slope)  683  0.287  0.453  405  0.259  0.439 
Inputs in production             
Labour per hectare  683  220.970  318.285  405  250.748  477.987 
Traction per hectare  683  23.841  25.680  405  14.761  17.546 
Manure  683  0.842  0.365  405  0.830  0.376 
Improved seeds  683  0.057  0.232  405  0.074  0.262 
Irrigation  683  0.182  0.386  405  0.099  0.299 
Modern fertiliser  683  0.069  0.253  405  0.074  0.262 
No. of hectares  683  0.811  0.728  405  0.935  0.899 
Region             
Tenta  683  0.174  0.380  405  0.600  0.491 
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 (Table 4 continued)  
Variable 
Non-participants  Participants 
Obs.  Mean  Std Dev.  Obs.  Mean  Std Dev. 
Theuldere  683  0.531  0.499  405  0.217  0.413 
Time             
Time dummy  683  0.495  0.500  405  0.521  0.500 
Crops grown in 2002             
Cereals  627  0.992  0.089  353  0.989  0.106 
Perennials  627  0.051  0.220  353  0.023  0.149 
Pulses  627  0.278  0.448  353  0.595  0.492 
Other categories  627  0.094  0.292  353  0.198  0.399 
Barley  627  0.150  0.357  353  0.354  0.479 
Maize  627  0.279  0.449  353  0.130  0.337 
Sorghum  627  0.356  0.479  353  0.210  0.408 
Teff  627  0.802  0.399  353  0.819  0.386 
Wheat  627  0.172  0.378  353  0.448  0.498 
Zengada  627  0.408  0.492  353  0.173  0.379 
Other cereals  627  0.091  0.288  353  0.184  0.388 
Crops grown in 1999              
Cereals  643  0.970  0.169  380  0.979  0.144 
Perennials  643  0.005  0.068  380  0.000  0.000 
Pulses  643  0.300  0.459  380  0.521  0.500 
Other categories  643  0.026  0.161  380  0.032  0.175 
Barley  643  0.022  0.146  380  0.079  0.270 
Maize  643  0.079  0.270  380  0.042  0.201 
Sorghum  643  0.123  0.329  380  0.053  0.224 
Teff  643  0.481  0.500  380  0.332  0.471 
Wheat  643  0.059  0.236  380  0.168  0.375 
Zengada  643  0.033  0.178  380  0.016  0.125 
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Table 5: Pooled WLS estimates of mean value function and pooled OLS 
estimates of the variance function  




PSNP  0.013  -0.023 
  (0.056)  (0.219) 
Family size (ln)  0.025  0.034 
  (0.067)  (0.264) 
Sex of head of household  -0.020  -0.357* 
  (0.063)  (0.211) 
Credit access  0.038  0.159 
  (0.046)  (0.179) 
Education of head of 
household 
0.017**  -0.002 
  (0.008)  (0.029) 
Livestock (TLU)13 (ln)  0.110***  -0.098 
  (0.034)  (0.136) 
Remittance  0.019  -0.031 
  (0.052)  (0.228) 
Corrugated roof  0.039  0.203 
  (0.040)  (0.157) 
No.  of male adults  -0.024  -0.035 
  (0.020)  (0.085) 
No. of female adults  0.008  -0.033 
  (0.024)  (0.103) 
Fertile  0.042  -0.095 
  (0.050)  (0.191) 
Infertile   -0.043  0.240 
  (0.060)  (0.203) 
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(Table 5 continued) 




Black  -0.094**  -0.040 
  (0.045)  (0.188) 
Red  -0.016  0.001 
  (0.041)  (0.179) 
Flat  0.163**  0.223 
  (0.066)  (0.299) 
Steep  -0.004  0.015 
  (0.047)  (0.199) 
Labour (ln)  0.578***  -0.055 
  (0.186)  (0.106) 
Traction (ln)  0.776***  -0.106 
  (0.154)  (0.107) 
No. of hectares (ln)  0.280  -0.237* 
  (0.200)  (0.140) 
Manure  -0.005  -0.517** 
  (0.064)  (0.204) 
Improved seed  -0.115  0.073 
  (0.077)  (0.284) 
Irrigation  -0.059  0.104 
  (0.053)  (0.192) 
Modern fertiliser  0.072  0.535** 
  (0.090)  (0.251) 
Theuldere  -0.290***  0.465** 
  (0.054)  (0.204) 
Tenta  -0.066  0.182 
  (0.063)  (0.268) 
Labour squared (ln)  -0.053***   
  (0.018)   
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(Table 5 continued) 




Traction squared (ln)  -0.093***   
  (0.023)   
No. of hectares (ln) squared   -0.210***   
  (0.032)   
Labour (ln)*Traction (ln)  -0.019   
  (0.028)   
Labour (ln)*Land (ln)  -0.120***   
  (0.038)   
Traction (ln)*Land (ln)  -0.048   
  (0.044)   
Time dummy  0.276***  -0.197 
  (0.053)  (0.206) 
Constant  4.568***  -1.676*** 
  (0.500)  (0.635) 
Observations14  1016  1016 
R-squared  0.379  0.034 
 Note:  The  dependent  variable  in  the  mean  value  function  is  the  log  value  of  total 
production (in Birr per hectare). The dependent variable in the variance function is the log 
squared residuals from the predicted mean value function. Standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. In the variance function, robust standard errors are reported. ***, ** and * 
indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively.  
   
                                                       
14 The number of observations is less than the total sample as the value of production is 0 
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Table 6: Random effects probit estimates by crop category   
Explanatory variables  Perennials  Pulses  Other 
categories 
PSNP  0.895**  -0.122  -0.056 
  (0.350)  (0.211)  (0.255) 
Basic controls  yes  yes  yes 
Control for household characteristics  yes  yes  yes 
Control for farm characteristics  yes  yes  yes 
Control for inputs in production  yes  yes  yes 
Control for previous production of crop category  no  yes  yes 
Control for average value of independent variables  yes  yes  yes 
Number of observations15  1073  970  970 
Number of households  576  538  538 
Percentage correctly predicted16  0.800  0.744  0.806 
Log-likelihood value  -410.386  -
442.535  -281.804 
Pseudo R-squared17  0.359  0.369  0.262 
Note: The dependent variable is dichotomous: it is 1 if the specific crop category was 
grown, and 0 otherwise. All regressions include a constant. Basic controls include time and 
regional dummies. Control for household characteristics, Control for farm characteristics and Control 
for inputs in production refer to the variables described in Table 4. Control for previous production 
of crop category is the lagged dependent variable (for the observation in 2007, the lagged value 
refers to an observation in 2005; and for the observation in 2005, the lagged value refers to 
an  observation  in  2002)  and  the  dependent  variable  in  1999.  Control  for  average  value  of 
independent variables is the average value for independent variables that have a correlation 
with the independent variable that is less than 0.8. The probability of growing cereal was 
not estimated, as almost all farmers grew some cereal. 
 
                                                       
15 The number of observations differs for perennials and the rest of the crop categories as 
too few households grew perennials in the first period; hence, the model could not be 
estimated when these variables were included. This means that a larger sample could be 
used in these estimations. 
16An observation is calculated as correctly predicted if the dependent variable is 1 and the 
probability of a positive outcome > 0.5 or if the dependent variable is 0 and the probability 
of a positive outcome   0.5. The probability of a positive outcome is calculated assuming 
that the random effect for that observation's panel is 0. 
17 Calculated as (1-log-likelihood function for the full model/log -likelihood function for 
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Table 7: Random effects probit estimates by cereal type   
Explanatory 
variables  Barley  Maize  Sorghum  Teff  Wheat  Zengada  Other 
cereals 
PSNP 
0.257  0.095  -0.326  0.199  0.525*  -0.548*  -0.307 
(0.242)  (0.263)  (0.285)  (0.199)  (0.268)  (0.309)  (0.254) 




yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Control for farm 








cereal type  
yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Control for 
average value of 
independent 
variables 
yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Number of 
observations  970  970  970  970  970  970  970 
Number of 




0.780  0.730  0.823  0.777  0.781  0.818  0.791 
Log-likelihood 
value  -305  -389  -272  -475  -364  -259  -289 
Pseudo R-
squared19  0.405  0.316  0.519  0.249  0.403  0.503  0.243 
Note: The dependent variable is dichotomous: it is 1 if the specific crop category was 
grown, and 0 otherwise. All regressions include a constant. Basic controls include time and 
regional dummies. Control for household characteristics, Control for farm characteristics and Control 
for inputs in production refer to the variables described in Table 4. Control for previous production 
of cereal type includes the lagged dependent variable (for the observation in 2007, the lagged 
value refers to an observation in 2005; and for the observation in 2005, the lagged value refers 
to the observation in 2002) and the dependent variable in 1999. Control for average value of 
independent variables is the average value for independent variables that have a correlation 
with the independent variable that is less than 0.8. 
   
                                                       
18 See footnote 17 
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Perennials  0.179 
Pulses  -0.031 
Other crop categories  -0.009 
 
 
Table 8b: Average partial effect of PSNP on the probability of growing 
cereal type 




 Barley  0.047 
Maize  0.020 
Sorghum  -0.050 
Teff  0.053 
Wheat  0.093 
Zengada  -0.079 
Other cereals types  -0.046 
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Table 9: Fixed effect estimates by crop category   
Explanatory variables  Cereals  Perennials  Pulses 
PSNP 
-0.028  2.926***  -0.315* 
(0.065)  (0.865)  (0.172) 
Basic controls  yes  yes  yes 
Control for household characteristics  yes  yes  yes 
Control for farm characteristics  yes  yes  yes 
Control for inputs in production  yes  yes  yes 
Observations  1050  296  494 
Number of hhid  573  271  335 
R-squared  0.911  0.962  0.544 
Note: The dependent variable is the log of the area (measured in hectares) planted with 
the specific crop category. Only samples with positive values on the dependent variables 
are  used.  All  regressions  include  a  constant.  Basic  controls  include  time  and  regional 
dummies. Control for household characteristics, Control for farm characteristics and Control for inputs in 
production refer to the variables described in Table 4. There were too few observations to 
estimate the area allocated to other crop categories.  
 
Table 10: Fixed effect estimates by cereal type 
Explanatory variables  Barley  Maize  Sorghum  Teff  Wheat  Zen-
gada 
PSNP 
-0.268  0.384  0.142  -0.166*  -0.045  0.275 
(0.211)  (0.311)  (0.188)  (0.098)  (0.175)  (0.19
3) 
Control for household 
characteristics  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  - yes 
Control for farm 
characteristics  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Control for inputs in 
production  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Observations  219  267  338  774  335  270 
Number of hhid  165  195  215  494  231  182 
R-squared  0.525  0.596  0.601  0.595  0.632  0.641 
Note: The dependent variable is the log of the area (measured in hectares) planted with 
the specific cereal type. Only samples with positive values for the dependent variables are 
used. All regressions include a constant. Basic controls include time and regional dummies. 
Control for household characteristics, Control for farm characteristics and Control for inputs in production 
refer to the variables described in Table 4. There were too few observations to estimate the 
area allocated to other cereal types.                               